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Abstract

The importance of board committees – specialized subgroups that exist to perform many of the board's
most critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying potential board members,
and overseeing financial reporting – has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and

greater complexity of the environment in which firms operate. This has resulted in a large body of work
examining board committees across the accounting, finance, and management disciplines. However,
this research has developed rather independently within each discipline, preventing scholars and
practitioners from developing a comprehensive understanding of board committees. To address this
issue, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature that: 1) summarizes and synthesizes
antecedents and outcomes associated with board committees in publicly-traded firms in English
common law countries; and 2) offers a critical analysis of existing research, providing recommendations
for advancements and new directions in board committee research.

Introduction
Boards of directors are an integral part of a firm's governance system; monitoring and advising
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and providing access to resources for firm adaptation
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Not surprisingly, prior research places substantial
attention on understanding what makes boards effective, including their composition, leadership
structure, decision processes, and dynamics (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2013; Krause et
al., 2013; Withers et al., 2012). While these studies inform our understanding of the entire board, it is
the specialized subgroups – the board's committees – that exist to manage details associated with its
most critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying new members, and
overseeing financial reporting.
Findings on the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance have been
inconclusive (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998, 2003; Johnson et al., 2013). Additionally, boards have been
criticized for failing to perform their fiduciary duties due to limited knowledge of firm intricacies,
coordination and cohesion issues among directors, and social loafing among board members (Boivie et
al., 2016). This has led some scholars to focus on board committees as the potential source for solving
the inherent deficiencies of the full corporate board. Prior research has identified important features of
committees that allow them to more diligently and comprehensively monitor and advise firm executives
and thus contribute to firm outcomes. In particular, by being smaller, meeting more frequently, and
drawing on the specialized expertise and abilities of their members, board committees can execute tasks
with greater efficiency and expediency (Kesner, 1988). In addition, due to their well-defined purpose
and clear expectations, it is suggested that board committees face greater scrutiny from various
stakeholders, which reduces individual free-riding and encourages more effective implementation of
their duties (Chen and Wu, 2016; Klein, 2002a).
The importance of board committees has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and
growing complexity of the business environment. Significantly greater demands are placed on board
members’ time and attention, as evidenced by a nearly 50 per cent increase in committees’ activities
and meetings across S&P 1500 firms over the last 15 years (Adams et al., 2015). A long-established
precept in organization theory is that firms develop specialized structures to handle complexity
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For example, the multitude of transactions in which executives engage
makes overseeing their activities more difficult, requiring the board to devise, approve and implement
more intricate compensation contracts. Specialized committees, such as the compensation committee,
enable boards to handle this complexity through subgroup-focused responsibility and expertise, while
also limiting the demands placed on individual directors. Therefore, the specialized expertise of board
committees is critical to the board's ability to reach effective decisions and fulfil its fiduciary duties.

However, the nature of committees and their specialized focus is likely to lead to dynamics substantively
different from those of the full board and may also create potential problems for both firm governance
and adaptation to changing circumstances. Appointment to a major board committee represents higher
status and importance for any director (Zhu et al., 2014). Status differences may be associated with
greater director power. Hence, committees may represent a greater power nexus within the overall
board of directors. Because board committees are smaller than the overall board, power is vested in a
small number of directors for managing the specific issues within a committee's domain. While research
on boards of directors overall suggests that smaller groups of directors will act more quickly (Goodstein
et al., 1994), smaller groups are less likely to have a diversity of perspectives. Thus, if important board
committees, such as the nominating committee, are dominated by a smaller, homogenous group of
directors, the resource dependence role of the board (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978) could be compromised by a misalignment of firm resource needs with director
capabilities and social capital. Thus, the vesting of certain board powers in a smaller subset of directors
has the potential to both facilitate and impede the effectiveness of the board.
As a result, research focused on board committee composition, dynamics, and impact on organizational
outcomes is growing, particularly in the disciplines of accounting, finance, and management. This is
illustrated in Table 1, which highlights the dramatic increase in studies examining board committees
since 2001. However, board committee research has generally developed independently within these
disciplines and the rich insights from each have remained confined to their respective fields.
Additionally, due to substantial changes in governance, study samples and research questions prior to
2001 may not reflect recent governance practices. The lack of a systematic and integrative review of the
literature prevents scholars and practitioners from developing a comprehensive understanding of what
we know, don't know, and should know about board committees. To address this gap, we conduct a
multidisciplinary review of board committee research, which aims to provide several contributions. First,
we offer a summary of existing management, finance and accounting research on board committees
and synthesize the main findings. In doing so, we outline and assess the main antecedents of board
committees and the key outcomes that board committees influence. Second, we identify weaknesses
and gaps in prior research that have prevented a more detailed understanding of board committees. In
particular, we posit that our understanding of how committees operate is rather limited because
scholars have extensively relied on committee structural characteristics. Instead, we suggest that a
greater focus on social and human capital of committee members, for example, may further enhance
our understanding of how committees operate in today's governance environment. Lastly, we focus on
several underexplored areas and offer recommendations for moving board committee research forward
in a manner more tightly integrated within the broader field of corporate governance.
Table 1. Studies examining board committees (from this literature review) by year
Year
Studies
Before 1990 5
1990 to 1995 4
1996 to 2000 16
2001 to 2005 32
2006 to 2010 40
2011 to 2015 39
2016 to 2018 6

Our paper is organized as follows. First, we outline and define key board committees and their roles.
Second, we detail our review criteria and categorize our review of antecedents and outcomes of board
committees. Based on our findings from reviewing existing research, we then identify opportunities for
future research to advance and expand our understanding of board committees’ role in corporate
governance.

Review of the Board Committee Literature
Board Committees Defined
Board committees exist for distinct purposes and are subgroups of directors currently sitting on a
corporation's board. Table 2 outlines the purpose, composition requirements and typical functions of
the three most common board committees for public firms in English common law countries, such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia: audit, compensation, and
nominating/governance committees.1

Table 2. Requirements and responsibilities of board committees in public firms
Committee
Membership requirements* Purpose
Audit
Independent outside
Oversee financial reporting
Required: USA
directors, one member must and disclosure.
Required of large firms:
be a financial expert.
UK, Canada and Australia

Compensation
Required: USA
Required of large firms:
Australia
Comply or Explain: UK and
Canada**

Independent outside
directors.

Recommend to the board
compensation structures of
executives and board
members.

Nominating / Governance
Required: USA
Comply or Explain: UK,
Canada and Australia

Fully independent outside
directors (NYSE), majority of
independent directors
(NASDAQ).

Seek and recommend new
board members.

Other non-required
committees (e.g.,

None

Varies

Typical functions
• Hire, manage and, if necessary, change
auditor.
• Oversee financial reporting and
accounting.
• Acquire other resources and expertise
necessary for financial reporting and
disclosure.
• Monitor the effectiveness of internal
audit and management controls.
• Monitor corporate governance,
regulatory compliance, and risk
management.
• Determine the terms of engagement and
compensation for the CEO and other
senior executives.
• Oversee stock option packages and
understand their effect on overall
compensation.
• Operate long term, performance-related
pay plans for executives.
• Find candidates with proper credentials
that can also work with current board
chairman and members.
• Assess each director's performance,
including meeting attendance and impact
of other directorships.
• Make recommendations on re-election.
• Recommend board members for
committee memberships.
• Functions are specific to the charter of
the non-required committee.

Executive, Strategy,
Finance, Environmental,
CSR)

Often associated with focus on a specific
problem and / or signaling commitment
to concerns of shareholders and other
external stakeholders.
Sources: Calkoen (2017), Chen and Wu (2016), Laux and Laux (2009), Tricker (2015), Withers et al. (2012)
* USA member requirements are stated. UK, Canada and Australia have similar but not identical requirements.
** Comply or explain means committee existence or composition is strongly recommended by governance codes for firms. Deviations from
board committee recommendations (i.e., non-compliance) must be explained in public securities filings.
•

In the Unites States, certain committees have become required by law or stock exchange rules in the last
several decades. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter referred to as SOX) required
all US-based publicly-traded firms to have an audit committee. Later, the two main US stock exchanges
(NYSE and NASDAQ) enacted requirements that all listed firms’ boards have compensation and
nominating committees. Because countries with institutions based in common law tend to have strong
property rights and investor protections, the major stock exchanges in Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom now require, at least for large firms, the existence of audit committees (Calkoen, 2017;
Tricker, 2015). Relatedly, governance codes in these countries strongly recommend that large public
firms have compensation and nominating committees whereby firms must file yearly governance
documents that either attest to the existence of these committees or explain why the firm does not
need the committee (i.e., this is commonly referred to as the ‘comply or explain’ rule in the UK). In
practice, large public firms in the UK tend to comply with the governance code. Indeed, 90 per cent of
FTSE 350 firms have both compensation and nominating committees (Calkoen, 2017). Compliance also
tends to be very high in Canada and Australia for large firms.2
Firms’ boards may also have additional committees specifically focused on areas such as strategic
planning, the environment, or corporate social responsibility (CSR) that are not required by law but may
reflect firm strategy, industry norms or a board's response to an issue or event. Boards continue to add
committees, with over 75 per cent of S&P 500 firms having at least one committee beyond those
required and 41 per cent having at least two additional committees as of 2016 (Ernst and Young Center
for Board Matters, 2018).

Method for Identifying Board Committee Studies

Following a process similar to previous highly-cited high quality reviews (see Haleblian et al., 2009), we
executed five steps to control our review's scope and ensure that our coverage of relevant studies was
logical and comprehensive. First, we focused on quantitative, empirical research of board committees in
the accounting, finance and management literatures. Second, given space limitations and the substantial
volume of board committee research, we limited our review to articles that had been published in
leading journals or were among the 100 most relevant published articles for each keyword in an
electronic keyword search (to be described shortly). The number of articles included in our literature
review tables from each journal, along with abbreviations for the journal titles, are shown in Appendix I.
Third, due to significant variations in regulations and corporate governance across countries (Donaldson
and Davis, 1994; Tricker, 2015), we only included studies of board committees for firms in the US, UK,
Canada and Australia. As discussed previously, such countries have strong investor protections and have
been at the forefront of the board committee movement. Other countries, such as Germany, have twotiered boards, while some have weak director independence rules, and emerging economies still have
developing corporate governance regimes (Aguilera, 2005). As such, our selected studies represent
economies where the board committee paradigm is the most developed, with the three main
committees either required or heavily emphasized by legal or institutional requirements, especially for
large firms.
Within the constraints of the first three steps, in our fourth step we used Google Scholar to search for
keywords: board committee, subcommittee, audit committee, nominating committee, and compensation
committee. This process yielded over 700 articles. Fifth, each article was reviewed to determine if it was
relevant for this review. Many articles were eliminated because they did not specifically operationalize

influences from or facets of one or more board committees, such as existence, composition, function,
behaviour, or outcomes. Additionally, similar to previous reviews of board research (see Johnson et
al., 2013), studies that examined not-for-profit boards were eliminated. Subsequently, our review
process identified 142 articles for inclusion; 57 from management, 42 from finance, and 43 from
accounting journals. Of the 142 articles, 83 examined audit committees, 59 studied compensation
committees and 39 focused on nominating/governance committees. Other committees examined
include: environmental (6 studies), executive (4), public affairs (2), CSR (2), and strategic planning (2).
Committees relating to public policy, ethics, finance, or technology were each explored in one study.
After identifying the 142 articles, we then coded and categorized the articles. Primary variables and key
findings were coded, enabling each article to first be placed into one of three categories: antecedents of
board committees, outcomes associated with board committees, and non-required committees. Each
article was then further grouped by its major topic within those three categories (e.g., executive
compensation as an outcome). Thus, we report the 142 articles in seven literature review tables. Within
each table, we then further sub-categorized the articles by the focal topic of the study (e.g., committee
composition for studies examining executive compensation). We also tried to identify the major
theoretical frame used in the article. We were conservative in identifying the theoretical framework and
only labelled it for a study in the tables if the authors clearly stated their theoretical background. As will
be seen in the tables, some studies lack a theoretical frame as the authors took a more
phenomenological focused approach in their study. The results from categorizing the articles are
illustrated in Figure 1 and form the basis for the following discussions of the antecedents and outcomes
of board committees.

Figure 1 Overview of board committee research

Antecedents of Board Committees 3

A major research area has been the antecedents of board committees. Studies in this area examine
questions such as: Why does the committee exist? What factors affect committee composition and
independence? What factors influence committee practices (e.g., frequency of meetings)? Below, we
discuss the following antecedents emphasized in prior research: legal requirements and institutional
pressures, governance characteristics, director human capital and interlocks, director demography, and
CEO behaviour (see Table 3).

Table 3. Antecedents of board committee existence and characteristics
Authors, Year; Journal
Theoretical frame
Type
Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was addressed
in methods)
Legal requirements and
institutional pressure
Armstrong, Core, and
A
Firms required to increase audit committee independence had a greater decrease
Guay, 2014; JFE
in information asymmetry. (e)
Arthaud-Day, Certo,
RD, Agency,
A
Audit committee member turnover was 70% more likely following restatements.
Dalton, and
Institutional
Stock market reaction to restatements and external prompting for restatements
Dalton, 2006; AMJ
were not found to increase the likelihood of audit committee member turnover.
Cheng, Huang, Li, and
Agency
A
Institutional lead plaintiff leads to greater independence of the audit committee.
Lobo, 2010; JFE
(e)
Del Guercio, Seery, and
C
54 activist campaigns identified in which the proponent requests one or more
Woidtke, 2008; JFE
specific and measurable actions, such as removing the CEO from the compensation
committee.
Duchin, Matsusaka and
A, C,
From 1998 to 2005, percentage of independent directors rose on audit committees
Ozbas, 2010; JFE
N
from 81 to 95% on audit committees, 72 to 92% on nominating committees, and 85
to 94% on compensation committees. (e)
Ertimur, Ferri, and
A, C
Audit committee members penalized via fewer votes when up for re-election when
Maber, 2012; JFE
backdating has occurred, but less than compensation committee members. For
firms involved in backdating, significant penalties (votes withheld when up for reelection) accrued to compensation committee members, particularly those who
served during backdating period.
Linck, Netter, and
A, N
After SOX, audit and nominating committee members met more often, some firms
Yang, 2008; RFS
increased audit committee chair and member compensation, and director turnover
increased substantially – particularly for audit committee members.
Laing and Weir, 1999;
All
U.K. firms, especially larger ones, followed the Cadbury Committee's
MD
recommendation that they employ a board committee structure, but there is little
evidence that this positively impacted firm performance. (United Kingdom)
Srinivasan, 2005; JAR
Efficient labour
A
High risk of turnover for audit committee members when there are severe incomemarkets, Agency
decreasing restatements. The relationship was weaker for income-increasing
restatements.
Valenti, 2008; JBE
Agency, RD
A, N
SOX was positively related to audit committee members who were CPAs or CFOs,
but negatively related to CEO membership on nominating committees.

Governance
characteristics
Anderson and
Reeb, 2004; ASQ
Cohen, Frazzini, and
Malloy, 2012; MS
Huang, Lobo, and
Zhou, 2009; CGIR

Agency,
Stewardship
Agency

N

Substitution

G

Liao and Hsu, 2013;
CGIR

N

A, C

Shivdasani and
Yermack, 1999; JOF

Bargaining power
theory of director
selection

N

Vafeas, 1999; JFE

Contracting, Agency

All

Self-determination

A, C

Director human capital
and interlocks
Boivie, Graffin, and
Pollock, 2012; AMJ
Cai, Garner, and
Walkling, 2009; JOF

A, C,
G

Founding-family presence on the nominating committee is negatively associated
with the proportion of directors that are independent. (e)
Firms with overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors have 29% fewer
independent nominating committee directors, are 30% less likely to be majority
independent, and more likely to have CEO serve on the nominating committee. (e)
Firms with a larger, more independent and more active board, higher agency costs,
and past occurrence of class-action lawsuits are more likely to voluntarily form a
governance committee. Governance committees constrain managerial
opportunism by reducing aggressive financial reporting. (e)
Common membership among compensation and audit committee is more likely in
firms with weak corporate governance and lacking financial and committee
resources. Firms with common membership have poorer earnings quality and
weaker pay-performance sensitivity. (e)
Firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more directors with
potential conflicts of interest when CEO serves on the nominating committee or no
nominating committee exists. CEO involvement with director selections negatively
moderates the relationship of independent director announcements with stock
price reactions. (e)
U.K. firms with a greater number of committees have more board meetings. No
relationship found for the number of committees with firm value. (United
Kingdom, e)
Serving as chair of the audit committee reduces the likelihood of a director exiting
the board by 29%, but serving as compensation committee chair increases the
likelihood of a director exiting the firm by 23%.
Directors serving on the audit, compensation and governance committees receive
fewer retention votes. Compensation committee members receive fewer votes
when the CEO receives higher abnormal compensation. Fewer votes for
governance committee members increase the likelihood of poison pill removal.
Governance committee member vote distribution influences the likelihood of
declassification. (e)

Erkens and
Bonner, 2012; TAR
Ferris, Jagannathan,
and Pritchard, 2003;
JOF
Field, Lowry, and
Mkrtchyan , 2013; JFE
Kesner, 1988; AMJ

A, N
Agency

A, C

Director Human
Capital
Agency, RD

A, N

Masulis and
Mobbs, 2014; JFE
Director demography
Bilimoria and
Piderit, 1994; AMJ
Conyon and
Mallin, 1997; CGIR
Peterson and
Philpot, 2007; JBE

A, C,
N, G,
Ex
A, C,
N

Experience- and
gender-based
biased views
RD

Firm status (i.e., larger, better connected, more admired) is negatively related to
the probability of naming an accounting financial expert to the audit committee.
Social status is lower for accounting financial experts on board than other directors.
Directors with more than two appointments participate in more committee
meetings, have more committee memberships, and chair more committees than
directors with one or two directorships.
Director busyness is positively related to serving on the audit and nominating
committees. (e)
Board members that are outsiders, have business-related functional experience
and have served longer on the board are positively associated with major
committee membership. Gender was not related to major board committee
membership.
Major committee membership is associated with significantly fewer absences.
Sitting on more prestigious boards is positively related to being a member of the
audit or compensation committee. (e)

C, Ex,
PA

Men were preferred for membership on compensation and executive committees,
while women were preferred for public affairs committees.

A, C,
N
All

While there are few women on the boards of UK firms, their membership on key
board committees is even lower. (United Kingdom, e)
Women more likely to sit on public-affairs committee and less likely to sit on
executive committee. No relationship found between gender and sitting on
nominating, compensation, finance and audit committees.
Similarity to committee members positively related to likelihood of being
appointed as major committee member or chair. Incumbents' prior experience with
demographically different directors is positively related to likelihood of being
appointed chair of a major committee.

Zhu, Shen, and
Hillman, 2014; ASQ

SC, Recategorization

A, C,
N, G,
Ex

CEO behavior
Jones, Li, and
Cannella, 2015; JOM

Institutional

N, G

CEOs more powerful than the board are more likely to avoid adoption of a
governance committee. Firms with a nominating committee adopted governance
committees faster. Prior service on any committee positively related to serving on
inaugural governance committee. (e)

Stern and
Westphal, 2010; ASQ

Interpersonal
attraction, SN

N

Increased likelihood of manager or outside director receiving a board appointment
when they exhibit ingratiating behaviour towards a CEO or director on the
nominating committee.
Westphal and
Interpersonal
N
CEO ingratiating behaviour and persuasion attempts are negatively related to
Bednar, 2008; ASQ
Influence, Social
creation of a nominating committee. CEO persuasion attempts with institutional
Influence
investors negatively moderate the relationship between institutional ownership
and the creation of independent nominating committee. (e)
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social Networking Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (Ex) Executive, (G) Governance, (N) Nominating, (PA)
Public Affairs.

Legal requirements and institutional pressure

A major driver of committee composition has been the mandatory legal requirements for greater
diligence by committee members. In the US, SOX was the major catalyst for increased committee
independence (i.e., reducing the number of insiders or affiliated directors), as audit, nominating and
compensation committee independence rose to 92 per cent or more between 1998 and 2005 (Duchin et
al., 2010).4 SOX has also encouraged more frequent meetings of audit and nominating committees,
discouraged CEO membership on the nominating committee, and led to greater director turnover,
especially for audit committee members, whose annual departure rate increased by over four per cent
between 2001 and 2004 (Linck et al., 2008; Valenti, 2008).
Stakeholder pressure also has increased committees’ monitoring capabilities. For example, Cheng et al.
(2010) show that when an institutional investor is a lead plaintiff in a lawsuit against a firm, the firm's
audit committee independence improves by over four per cent two years after the lawsuit was filed.
Similarly, the existence of activist campaigns, such as ‘just vote no’ campaigns designed to withhold
votes toward the election of directors, has encouraged firms to remove the CEO from the compensation
committee (Del Guercio et al., 2008).
Violation of legal requirements and established institutional norms, such as involvement in questionable
activities, has been commonly examined as an antecedent to committee membership and composition.
For example, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) find that following financial restatements, audit committees face
a 70 per cent increase in the likelihood of member turnover. Similarly, Srinivasan (2005) provides
evidence that restatements for at least five quarters increase the likelihood of audit committee member
removal by 10 per cent. Relatedly, when stock option backdating scandals occur, compensation and
audit committee members are penalized by receiving fewer re-election votes and are more likely to step
down (Ertimur et al., 2012). For instance, compensation committee members during the backdating
period received 10 per cent fewer re-election votes compared to a two to three per cent penalty for
other directors. Since such violations undermine a firm's legitimacy, the firm undertakes aggressive
efforts to disassociate itself from the guilty actors and restore its credibility among stakeholders
(Suchman, 1995). As a result, severe penalties accrue to committee members who are tasked with, but
fail to ensure, compliance to existing norms and regulations.

Governance characteristics

Another important committee antecedent is the quality of the firm's governance. Anderson and Reeb
(2004), for instance, found that power wielded by founding-family members influenced nominating
committee membership and, subsequently, board membership. Firms with weaker governance
arrangements, such as the presence of overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors, had, on average,
29 per cent fewer independent nominating committee members (Cohen et al., 2012). Similarly, weak
governance systems have been associated with common membership among compensation and audit
committees (Liao and Hsu, 2013). In contrast, strong-governance firms – those with more independent
and active boards – are more likely to voluntarily form a governance committee (Huang et al., 2009).

Director human capital and interlocks

Many studies have used a human capital lens to examine how directors’ characteristics impact their
membership on, and overall composition of, various committees. Viewing multiple directorships as
evidence of a director's quality (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), Masulis and Mobbs (2014) found that
directors who sit on multiple boards are more likely to obtain additional committee memberships and

chair a major committee. Those arguments are confirmed by Field et al. (2013), who provide evidence
that busy directors (i.e., those sitting on three or more boards) have greater experience, qualifications
and network connections, increasing their chances of serving on audit and nominating committees by 20
and 40 per cent, respectively. Kesner (1988) shows that characteristics indicating director competence
and expertise in setting and overseeing the implementation of firm strategies, such as being an outsider,
having business-related functional experience and serving longer on the board, are positively related to
major committee membership. Similarly, Boivie et al. (2012) provide evidence that audit committee
chairs are 29 per cent less likely to exit the firm, suggesting that firms take steps to retain the knowledge
and experience associated with committees leaders.

Director demography

An emphasis in research on director demography has been the inclusion of female directors on board
committees. Studies point to the existence of bias against female directors, suggesting little has changed
from earlier findings that posit ‘women are not window dressing but do not hold important positions on
the boards of large corporations’ (Kesner, 1988, p. 80). For example, after controlling for directors’
experience, scholars have found that women are less likely to be appointed to committees responsible
for key governance functions of US firms (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Peterson and Philpot, 2007).
Conyon and Mallin (1997) found a similar bias against women being appointed to key committees in UK
firms, with women comprising only 2.49 per cent of board memberships in FTSE350 firms and only half
of female directors serving on major committees. These findings suggest that there is a continued
prevalence of deeply held stereotypes against female board members, as evidenced by women having
career experience valuable to the board but perceived as lacking the experience necessary to serve on
key committees (Heilman et al., 1989; Hillman et al., 2002).
In a different vein, Zhu et al. (2014) find that directors who are similar to other directors along certain
demographic characteristics are more likely to be accepted as both members and chairs of major board
committees. While these studies inform our understanding of committee composition, further
exploration is needed. Specifically, examining if and how age, racial and functional background diversity
are associated with the composition and effectiveness of board committees may increase our
understanding of committee membership and function, as well as the degree to which boards embrace
diversity. Additionally, as prior research has found that a firm's links to other firms with female directors
is positively related to female board members (Hillman et al., 2007), extending this research to the
committee level may offer a greater understanding of the causes and degree of bias against female and
other minority directors.

CEO behavior

The ways in which CEOs influence committee formation have also been examined. Westphal and Bednar
(2008) showed that CEOs’ use of ingratiating behaviour and persuasion towards representatives of
institutional investors helped prevent the formation of an independent nominating committee. Jones et
al. (2015) offer empirical support for the argument that powerful CEOs are more likely to avoid or defy
the adoption of a governance committee; a 20 per cent increase in CEO power relative to the board was
associated with a 60 per cent decrease in adoption of a governance committee. While such power for
CEOs is restricted to some degree by legal requirements, it still plays an important role in new director
nomination and committee formation. Further research is encouraged to help understand how CEOs

influence committee formation and composition, as well as new research that examines how power is
developed and wielded within committees and in their interaction with CEOs.

Outcomes of Board Committees 5
An extensive body of research has examined the outcomes of board committees, seeking to explain how
board committees’ existence, independence, composition and turnover influence important outcomes,
including firm performance and value, executive compensation, financial misconduct and inappropriate
behaviour, and accounting practices. It is important to acknowledge that while board committees might
be instrumental in affecting the above outcomes, the full board also impacts those outcomes by
ratifying committee decisions, although the extent to which authority is held and exercised at the board
or committee level is largely unknown (see Tables 4-9).

Firm performance and value

A substantial volume of prior research has focused on how committee independence influences firm
performance. Drawing on agency theory logic (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), scholars have argued that
committee independence is critical for protecting shareholders’ interests because it allows for objective
assessment of firm strategies and constrains CEO opportunistic behaviour. Research on audit committee
independence generally finds a positive relationship between independence and performance. For
example, Aggarwal and colleagues in two studies found a positive impact from audit committee
independence on firm value and market return (Aggarwal et al., 2008, 2011). Relatedly, the presence of
expert independent audit committee members positively influences firm performance (Chan and
Li, 2008), and the market positively receives announcements of financial experts joining audit
committees (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005). Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) further illustrate the
focus on and importance of committee member independence by showing that the death of an
independent audit committee member is associated with a two per cent abnormal drop in stock price.
Notably, however, Klein (2002b) reported a negative association between audit committee
independence and financial performance.
Somewhat contrarily, studies examining the effects of nominating and compensation committee
independence on firm performance have produced rather ambiguous results. Some studies report that
when these two committees are independent, firms exhibit higher performance (Grove et al., 2011;
Hoechle et al., 2012) and are more likely to avoid bankruptcy (Platt and Platt, 2012). Yet, other studies
find a positive relationship between insiders on the nominating committee and market return,
suggesting the importance of management participation in director selection (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003).
In particular, Klein (1998) provides evidence that a more independent compensation committee results
in lower productivity from the firm's long-term assets. Similarly, Faleye (2007) found nominating
committee independence was associated with a 12 to 14 per cent lower market return. The equivocal
pattern of findings for nominating and compensation committees suggests that committee
independence may have positive benefits for some firms, while imposing burdens on others. However,
these equivocal results may also be driven by reliance on datasets from different eras. In addition, the
mixed results across different committee types should serve as caution against claims that
independence is the panacea for reducing agency costs when examining the monitoring function of
board committees.
Beyond the effects of committee independence, prior research also provides evidence regarding
committees’ attention to their tasks and firm performance. Falato et al. (2014) found that a busy

director who serves on another board in which that firm incurs the death of the CEO or board member
was associated with a 1.37 per cent decrease in stock price, while Dey (2008) found that an effective
audit committee (e.g., fully independent, meets more often, has a financial expert) increases financial
return for all levels of agency conflicts. No relationship has been found for committee gender and racial
diversity with firm performance (Carter et al., 2010).

Executive compensation

As with firm performance, most studies have utilized agency theory to investigate relationships between
committee characteristics and oversight of executive compensation. Consistent with agency theory,
some studies find that strong committee governance constrains managerial attempts to capture larger
and potentially unmerited financial compensation. For example, blockholders sitting on the
compensation committee has been found to be associated with decreases in total CEO compensation
and increases in equity incentives (Conyon and He, 2004). Similarly, Cyert et al. (2002) report that
doubling compensation committee members’ stock ownership results in about a four per cent reduction
in predicted CEO contingent compensation and about a five per cent reduction in predicted CEO equity
compensation, while Sun and Cahan (2009) show that CEO cash compensation is more tightly linked to
accounting earnings for compensation committees with higher quality.6
Committee member independence has also been a point of emphasis in studies of compensation
committees in non-US firms, with studies finding that independence positively moderates the
relationships of non-proxy-based activism, involving verbal steps taken by activist shareholders (e.g.,
statements to the media), with Canadian CEO contingent compensation (Chowdhury and Wang, 2009)
and U.K. top management pay with firm performance (Conyon and Peck, 1998). In contrast, the absence
of diligent committee monitoring allows CEOs to extract greater pay. For example, CEOs enjoy bonuses
relative to merger deal sizes that are approximately 100 per cent greater when they sit on the
nominating committee (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), and approximately 30 per cent greater total
compensation when audit committee members are linked to, and socially dependent on, the CEO
(Hwang and Kim, 2009). In line with those findings, Stathopolous et al. (2004) provide evidence that
total pay for UK CEOs, via issuance of in-the-money stock options, increases when they sit on the
compensation committee.
However, some research offers findings which do not support agency theory arguments. Chhaochharia
and Grinstein (2009) fail to find evidence that compensation and nominating committee independence
are related to CEO compensation. Moreover, Guthrie et al. (2012) found that two outliers in
Chhaochharia and Grinstein's study (Apple and Fossil) biased their study and, after accounting for
outliers, find that requirements for compensation committee independence lead to increases in US CEO
total pay; findings consistent with those of Masulis et al. (2012) who report a positive relationship
between foreign independent directors on the compensation committee and CEO pay. Finally, the
presence of ‘captured’ board members on the compensation committee was found to not be associated
with greater changes in CEO compensation and total CEO compensation (Daily et al., 1998). Captured
board members are directors who are affiliated with the firm (i.e., personal or professional relationships
with the firm or its executives) or are interdependent (i.e., appointed after the CEO started in his or her
position). Such findings that conflict with agency theory arguments suggest that directors serving on
powerful committees, regardless of whether they are independent, may prioritize their obligation to
shareholders (Daily, 1996; Daily et al., 1998) or that an optimal contracting perspective, in which higher

CEO compensation reflects the market price for greater managerial quality, supersedes agency theory in
some contexts (Masulis et al., 2012).
Overall, our review of compensation committee influence reveals support for agency theory predictions
of CEO compensation is rather mixed. This is likely why scholars use other theoretical frameworks with
agency theory. In particular, recent work argues that committees’ monitoring can be enhanced when
members have sufficient knowledge and expertise. Building theory on knowledge transfer and
exchange, Brandes et al. (2016) examined how linking ‘pin’ directors (i.e., directors serving on the audit
and compensation committees) are associated with reduced CEO compensation. In a study focusing on
other top executives, Gore et al. (2011) find support for the presence of a finance committee or a CEO
with a financial background leading to lower incentive-based pay for the chief financial officer, arguing
that this supported relationship is evidence that financial expertise is an important component of
effective monitoring.
Moving away from agency theory, scholars have attempted to provide alternative explanations of how
and why board committees impact executive compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) employ social
identity theory and the similarity-attraction paradigm to argue that CEOs are treated more favourably
when they are demographically similar to the compensation committee. The authors find that CEO pay
is more closely tied to firm performance when compensation committee members’ tenure is more
dissimilar to the CEO's tenure. Belliveau et al. (1996) also examine similarity, but focus on social status
differences between CEOs and their compensation committee chairs. Consistent with the position that
social status affects influence and dependence among individuals, the study indicates that a CEO with
higher relative social status than the compensation committee chair receives greater compensation.
Alternatively, a compensation committee chair with higher social status than the CEO constrains CEO
pay.
A nascent, but growing research stream focuses on the effects of CEO and compensation committee
members’ political beliefs on compensation. Using political psychology and upper echelon perspectives,
Gupta and Wowak (2017) found that politically conservative compensation committees, in which their
members have donated more often, over a longer period of time and in greater amounts to the
Republican party in the US, were positively associated with total CEO pay and greater rewards for strong
financial performance. On the other hand, Chin and Semadeni (2017) found that politically liberal CEOs
and compensation committees, who prioritize both egalitarianism and equality, are associated with
greater pay equality among non-CEO executives. These two studies are examples of how established
management theory can be integrated with social constructs to offer new and relevant insights into
corporate governance.
Finally, research has examined the criteria compensation committees use to determine executive
compensation. In their test of which of two theories better explain CEO compensation, O'Reilly et al.
(1988) found no support for a tournament theory argument in which CEO pay is greater when a firm has
more vice presidents. However, the authors found support for a model developed from social
comparisons and suggested this finding indicates that compensation committee members’ judgments
on CEO pay are anchored by their own pay. Relatedly, scholars have argued that compensation
committees may consider the regulatory environment (Perry and Zenner, 2001), anticipated market
rates (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002), and compensation across unrelated firms (Faulkender and
Yang, 2010) to determine CEO pay at their own firms.

Misconduct and inappropriate behaviour

Common types of questionable firm behaviour include earnings management, fraud/crime, and stock
option manipulation. While financial reporting requires judgment, firms have techniques to create
unjustifiably positive views of earnings, such as taking abnormal accruals. Research, however, has
consistently shown that stronger monitoring by committees, measured as having a majority of
independent directors serving on at least two of the three major committees, reduces abnormal
accruals7 (Faleye et al., 2011). For example, Klein (2002a) found that audit committee independence was
negatively associated with abnormal accruals. Badolato et al. (2014) examined audit committees’ status
(i.e., career advancement, achievement and prestige) relative to management and financial expertise,
finding that both were positively associated with lower abnormal accruals and reduced accounting
irregularities. Bedard et al. (2004) had similar findings, but also found that excluding audit committee
members from receiving stock options reduced aggressive earnings management. Additionally,
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2013) considered social network ties from friendships and advice networks
between audit committee members and CEOs, finding that friendship ties were positively associated
with earnings management, as well as auditors reporting internal control weaknesses and goingconcerns. Finally, audit committee independence and legal expertise have been found to enhance the
quality of financial reporting and reduce the likelihood of restatement (Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan et
al., 2011).
In a study of firms committing white collar crime, Schnatterly (2003) found that actions associated with
strong governance (i.e., audit committee independence, more frequent meetings) did not impact the
likelihood of a first criminal event but did impact the likelihood of subsequent criminal activity. Uzun et
al. (2004) reported similar findings, but their study further suggested that the percentage of grey
directors (i.e., outside directors having some non-board affiliation with the firm) on major committees
was positively associated with fraud. Interestingly, while studies of fraud remain common today, we
identified no committee studies in which crime is operationalized as criminal charges against firms
following the 2002 passage of SOX in the US.
The manipulation of stock option pricing is another behaviour that has received attention. Bebchuk et al.
(2010) examined the opportunistic granting of stock options and found the existence of an independent
compensation committee did not influence opportunistic stock option grants, but the presence of a
large blockholder on an independent compensation committee reduced opportunistic grant timing by
71 per cent. Blockholders on the compensation committee, as well as an outsider as compensation
committee chair, were also negatively associated with the likelihood of stock option repricing (Callaghan
et al., 2004). However, directors serving on the compensation and nominating committee profited more
from buying and selling their firm's stock than directors serving on the audit or other committees (Cao et
al., 2014), suggesting information asymmetries may exist even among directors on the same board.
Overall, our review of prior work revealed that greater expertise and stronger diligence at the
committee level, especially in the audit committee, are appropriate mechanisms for preventing or
reducing managerial misconduct. However, we were surprised that little attention has been paid to
committee member misconduct and how board committees restore trust following fraud and other
types of inappropriate behaviour. Farber's (2005) results suggest that firms recovering from fraud have
more frequent audit committee meetings, while Chan et al. (2012) found that audit committee size was
positively associated with adopting clawback provisions (i.e., compensation recovery provisions that
allow the firm to recoup compensation from its executives involved in accounting improprieties). Yet, no

research was identified that examined changes in nominating or compensation committee membership
or function when firms were attempting to recover from trust violations.

Accounting practices

Research primarily from the accounting field has also examined how audit committee diligence and
quality impact accounting practices. For example, financial reporting quality, measured as fewer
restatements and discretionary accruals, was improved by the audit committee having greater legal and
accounting expertise (Krishnan et al., 2011), as well as a greater number of accounting and industry
experts (Cohen et al., 2013). Similarly, fully independent and active audit committees were associated
with a reduced likelihood of restatements and larger recognition of loan loss provisions (Abbott et
al., 2004; Leventis et al., 2013). Indeed, in pre-IPO firms the mere presence of an audit committee can
reduce accruals (Venkataraman et al., 2008). Finally, effective audit committees help managers make
more accurate earnings forecasts that result in positive market reactions (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).

Other firm-level outcomes

The relationship of committee composition with other firm outcomes has also received attention.
Gomulya and Boeker (2016) studied CEO replacement following a financial restatement and found a
positive relationship between replacing an audit committee member and the likelihood of CEO
replacement, suggesting that multiple actors could receive blame for financial misconduct. In addition,
Zhang (2008) found that the likelihood of a new CEO's dismissal was reduced by the presence of an
independent nominating committee when the CEO was hired, and further reduced when nominating
committee members had fewer other directorships. Guo and Masulis (2015) found that nominating
committee independence resulted in more effective CEO monitoring and discipline. In line with those
findings, Anderson et al. (2004) reported that firms with larger and independent audit committees have
lower costs of debt financing (i.e., they obtain debt more cheaply). Further, research has indicated that
greater committee independence can limit firm involvement in value-decreasing acquisitions (Faleye et
al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). Indeed, the relationship of major board committee independence
with outcomes such as leadership, structural change and more effective financing provides strong
support for the beneficial role of independence for major board committees. Comparing these results
with the equivocal findings on the link between board committee independence and firm performance
suggests that performance may be less controllable by board committees than more proximal drivers of
performance.

Less traditional committees

A small number of studies examined the function and outcomes of other less traditional committees
which have yielded valuable insights into firms’ priorities and actions. The presence of a strategic
planning committee was found to be related to executives participation in strategic planning
(Henke, 1986) and a lesser likelihood of focusing on short-term financial outcomes at the expense of
long-term initiatives (Beekun et al., 1998). The presence of an environmental committee was found to
increase transparency related to environmental issues (Peters and Romi, 2014), improve a firm's
environmental performance (Walls et al., 2012), and reduce industry fines (Davidson and Worrell, 2001).
While these studies provide insights regarding the presence and actions of less common committees,
further research examining the roles and impact of such committees is needed. Firms and their boards
may be pre-dispositioned to prioritize certain issues (e.g., strategic planning, environmental) and, thus,
the presence of a committee may only be a related outcome. Additionally, external stakeholders,

analysts and media may emphasize that specific domains require firm attention following a reputation
damaging event (e.g., environmental violation), resulting in a committee being formed that may or may
not have the necessary intentions and discretion to prioritize actions over other firm initiatives. Studies
examining the actions and outcomes of firms adding such committees following poor performance in
the associated domain may yield valuable insights into how such committees affect executive behavior,
stakeholder perceptions of the firm, and firm outcomes.

Cross-Disciplinary Comparison
One advantage of a cross-disciplinary approach to reviewing board committee research is capturing a
sizeable breadth of the literature, as well as differences in theoretical and empirical specifications. As
noted previously, committee research has accumulated in isolation across the management, finance and
accounting disciplines. However, one similarity across disciplines is the relative dominance of agency
theory as a theoretical framework (see Tables 4 through 9).

Table 4. Outcomes: Firm performance and value
Authors, Year; Journal
Theoretical frame
Committee independence affecting
firm performance and value
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and
Matos, 2011; JFE
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and
Williamson, 2008; RFS
Callahan, Millar, and
Schulman, 2003; JCF

Chan and Li, 2008; CGIR

Agency

Type

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was
addressed in methods)

A

Audit committee independence is positively related to firm performance.
(Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Australia; e)
Audit committee independence is associated with higher firm value.
(Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, e)
CEO and other insider membership on nominating committee is positively
related to market return. Number of nominating committee meetings is
negatively related to market return. Delegating nominating responsibility
to another committee with CEO involvement is positively related to market
return. Percentage of outside CEOs on nominating committee is negatively
related to market return.
Presence of expert, independent directors on the audit committee
enhances firm value. (e)
With new rules for committee independence, firms with fewer
independent committees have higher abnormal stock returns. Effect
greatest for medium/large firms, with less abnormal returns for small firms
without independence, suggesting independence requirements impose
significant costs on small firms.
Affiliated directors on the audit committee are positively related to prepackaged bankruptcy filings and negatively related to time spent in
reorganization.
Nominating committee independence negatively related to firm value,
positively related to director turnover, and positively moderates impact of
shareholder wealth changes on CEO compensation. (e)
Weak evidence of a negative association of affiliated committees with
financial performance in the period leading to the financial crisis. (e)
An independent nominating committee is negatively related to excess firm
value and positively related to cumulative abnormal returns from a
diversifying acquisition. Diversified firms are less likely to have an
independent nominating committee. (e)

A
Bargaining power
theory of director
selection

N

Agency

A

Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007;
JOF

A, C,
N

Daily, 1996; SMJ

Agency, RD

A

Faleye, 2007; JFE

Agency

N

Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and
Xu, 2011; CGIR
Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and
Yermack, 2012; JFE

Agency

A, C

Agency

N

Klein, 1998; JLE

Agency, FR

C

Klein, 2002b; TAR

Agency, TCE

A

Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; JFE

Agency

A, N

Platt and Platt, 2012; JBR

Agency, RD,
Stewardship

A, C,
N

Agency

A

Director expertise affecting firm
performance and value
Davidson, Xie, and Xu, 2004; JAPP
DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005; JAR

A

Interlocks affecting firm
performance and value
Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; JFE

A

Kang, 2008; AMJ

Committee
characteristics/composition
affecting firm performance and
value

Signalling,
Attribution

A, G

Percentage of outside directors on the compensation committee is
negatively related to productivity. The market reacts positively to the
announcement of an increased percentage of outside directors on the
compensation committee. (e)
Audit committee independence is positively related to board size and
independence and negatively related to firm growth and financial
performance. (e)
The death of an independent member of the audit or nominating
committee is negatively associated with abnormal negative returns. (e)
Major committee's size and percentage of independent directors positively
related and percentage of grey directors on the audit and compensation
committee negatively related to firm avoiding bankruptcy.
Newly announced audit committee members with experience in financial
oversight, employed by a CPA firm, or working as an audit consultant are
positively associated with cumulative abnormal returns.
Naming an accounting financial expert to the audit committee is positively
related to market reaction; this relationship is positively moderated by
strong governance.
Investor reactions at interlocked firms are more negative if a director being
sued serves on the interlocked firm's audit committee. Outside directors
are more likely to lose other board appointments when the outside
director sits on the audit committee of the interlocked firm.
Reputational penalties, measured as cumulative abnormal returns, are
associated with interlocked board members serving as audit chair of an
accused or associated firm and for an interlocked board member being the
governance committee chair of the associated, but not the accused, firm.

Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and
Simpson (2010); CGIR

RD, Human
Capital, Agency

No significant relationship found between the gender or ethnic diversity of
important board committees and financial performance for a sample of
major US corporations. (e)
Dey, 2008; JAR
Agency
A
Audit committee effectiveness is positively related to the level of agency
conflicts and to financial and market performance for all levels of agency
within firms. (e)
Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; JFE
Agency
C
A busy compensation committee leads to more rent extraction in target
firms. CEOs of target firms get more options and shareholders suffer more
value loss. (e)
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and
Agency
A, C, CEO or a director's death at firm A makes other interlocked directors on
Lel, 2014; JFE
N
major committees of firm B busier and this results in lower cumulative
abnormal returns. Results are stronger for the audit committee. (e)
Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011; Agency
A, C, Independent directors serving on at least 2 of the 3 monitoring committees
JFE
N
improve board's monitoring quality (e.g., increased sensitivity of turnover
to firm performance, less discretionary accruals, reduced excess
compensation). Yet, improved monitoring jeopardizes board advising
quality and results in lower acquisition performance and lower innovation.
In firms with high advising needs, weaknesses in board advising outweigh
the benefits of intense monitoring and lead to reduction in firm value. (e)
Gerety, Hoi, and Robin, 2001; FM
Agency
N
Relationship of stock market reaction to proposals of incentive plans for
board members is negatively moderated by the CEO being on or the firm
not having a nominating committee.
Yermack, 1997; JOF
C
Firms receive lower cumulative abnormal returns following option awards
when the compensation committee includes a non-executive board chair
or an outside blockholder. CEOs can change the timing of stock option
grants by influencing the timing of the compensation meeting.
For Theoretical Frame: (FR) Free Rider, (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (TCE) Transaction Cost Economics.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (G) Governance, (N) Nominating.
Table 5. Outcomes: Executive compensation
Authors, Year; Journal
Theoretical frame

A, C,
N

Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in
methods)

Committee
independence
Capezio, Shields, and
O'Donnell, 2011; JMS

Agency, MP,
Behavioural
Agency

Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2009; JOF
Chowdhury and
Wang, 2009; JOM

C, N

Salience, Agency

Conyon and Peck, 1998;
AMJ
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand,
and Dalton, 1998; AMJ
Ferrell, Liang, and
Renneboog, 2016; JFE
Focke, Maug, and
Niessen-Ruenzi, 2017;
JFE
Guthrie, Sokolowsky,
and Wan, 2012; JOF
Hwang and Kim, 2009;
JFE

C

C

C, N

Agency, SC,
Institutional,
Stewardship
Agency

C
C

C
C, N
Agency

A

Non-executive members on Australian firms’ compensation committees positively
associated with non-incentive CEO pay, but no relationship found between
compensation committee independence and CEO incentive pay and total pay.
(Australia, e)
Following the passage of SOX, firms previously noncompliant with new requirements
have a 17% reduction in compensation associated with board independence. No effect
found for nominating and compensation committee independence with CEO
compensation. (e)
Compensation committee independence positively moderates the relationship of nonproxy-based activism with the portion of Canadian CEOs’ compensation that is
contingent. No significant interaction found for compensation committee
independence and proxy-based activism. (Canada)
Outside directors on the remuneration committee of UK firms positively influenced
the relationship of top management pay with corporate performance. Outside
directors on the nominating committee did not influence the pay-for-performance
relationship. (United Kingdom)
Affiliated or interdependent directors were not found to change the level, or the mix
of types, of compensation.
For worldwide firms, including non-investment trust firms in the FTSE250,
independent compensation committee negatively related to CEO total compensation.
Excessive CEO pay negatively related to corporate social responsibility. (Canada,
United Kingdom, United States, Australia, e)
The effect of a firm's prestige on CEO compensation is stronger in firms with
independent compensation committees. (e)
Requirements for compensation committee independence increased CEO and nonCEO executive compensation.
CEOs whose audit committees are conventionally independent, but socially linked to
the CEO, receive larger bonuses than equivalent CEOs whose audit committees are
conventionally and socially independent.

Main and
Johnston, 1993; ABR
Masulis, Wang and
Xie, 2012; JAE

Agency,
Anchoring
Agency

C

sc, sn

C

Brandes, Dharwadkar,
and Suh, 2016; SMJ

Agency, UE

A, C

Conyon and He, 2004;
JMAR

Agency, MP, SOC

C

Grinstein and
Hribar, 2004; JFE
Stathopoulos,
Espenlaub, and
Walker, 2004; JMAR

Agency, MP

N

Agency, MP,
Perceived Cost

C

Young and
Buchholtz, 2002; JMI

Agency,
Stewardship,
Social Identity

C

Committee composition
Belliveau, O'Reilly, and
Wade, 1996; AMJ

Political orientation

A, C

Presence of a compensation committee in UK firms positively associated with CEO pay,
but not associated with the incentive structure of pay. (United Kingdom)
Foreign independent directors on audit committees are positively associated with
restatements. Foreign independent director on compensation committee are
associated with higher CEO compensation and a lower percentage of equity-based
CEO compensation. (e)
Compensation committee chair status associated with reduced CEO compensation.
CEOs with higher social status than the compensation committee chair receive 16%
higher pay. CEOs paired with a low-status compensation committee chair receive
higher pay than CEOs paired with a high-status chairs.
Member overlap among compensation and audit committees suppresses total
compensation and is positively associated with salary, but not equity, as a proportion
of total compensation. Committee overlap negatively associated with total
compensation and positively associated with CEO salary. Committee overlap has a
stronger negative effect on total and equity based compensation when less
conservative accounting practices are followed. (e)
Venture capitalists on compensation committee and committee member pay
negatively associated and blockholders positively associated with equity incentives.
Compensation committee member pay positively associated with CEO compensation.
No support for managerial power model determinants with CEO compensation and
equity.
CEO on the nominating committee associated with greater CEO bonus pay. (e)
Other executives on UK compensation committees negatively associated with nonexecutive salary plus bonus and positively associated with non-executive total pay.
CEO or only non-executives on compensation committee positively associated with
CEO total pay. CEO on compensation committee negatively associated with other
executives’ long term pay. (United Kingdom)
Age dissimilarity between compensation committee members and the CEO positively
related to CEO total compensation change. Relationship negatively moderated by firm
performance. Firm performance positively moderates relationship between tenure
dissimilarity and change in total CEO compensation.

Chin and
Semadeni, 2017; SMJ
Gupta and
Wowak, 2017; ASQ
Committee
characteristics
Cyert, Kang, and
Kumar, 2002; MS

UE

C

Agency, UE

C

Agency, MP,
Options

C

Persons, 2006; JBE

C

Sun and Cahan, 2009;
CGIR

Agency

C

Tosi and GomezMejia, 1989; ASQ
Committee anchoring
Adut, Cready, and
Lopez, 2003; TAR

Agency

C

Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Naveen, 2008; JFE
Ezzamel and
Watson, 2002; JMS

C
C
Equity, SC

Faulkender and
Yang, 2010; JFE
Fich, Starks, and
Yore, 2014; JFE

C
C

Agency

C

The liberalism of the compensation committee strengthens the positive relationship
between CEO liberalism and TMT horizontal pay equality. (e)
Compensation committee political conservatism is positively related to CEO pay.
Financial performance positively moderates the relationship of compensation
committee conservatism and CEO pay. (e)
Compensation committee members’ stock ownership in company negatively related to
CEO base salary, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation.
Compensation committee members’ stock ownership negatively associated with CEO
discretionary compensation in small, but not large, firms.
No reduction in compensation for firms with fraud or lawsuits if there is a larger
compensation committee. Compensation committee characteristics not associated
with CEO dismissal if there is fraud or lawsuit.
CEO current compensation more positively associated with accounting earnings when
firms have higher compensation committee quality. Positive effect of compensation
committee quality on the association between CEO current compensation and
accounting earnings is less in high growth or loss-making firms. (e)
Monitoring of CEO pay is positively related to compensation committee influence in
both management and owner controlled firms.
Compensation committees intervene to modify the firm's net income used to
determine CEO compensation when there are reported restructurings; The extent of
the intervention is dependent on the frequency of the restructurings and CEO tenure.
Boards use various criteria (e.g., referencing peer firms, firm size, relative
performance) to determine CEO compensation structure.
UK compensation committees adjust CEO pay in line with anticipated market rates,
rather than being consistent with pay changes for other committee members. (United
Kingdom)
Compensation committees seem to endorse compensation peer groups that include
unrelated firms, possibly because such firms would potentially ratchet up the level of
pay for the CEOs
Deal-making firms’ boards are significantly less likely than non-deal-making boards to
cite financial performance measures as justification for increasing CEO pay and to

mention growth as a rationale for compensation decisions. However, deal-making
boards are more likely to rely upon measures of CEO non-financial performance to
justify pay raises. (e)
O'Reilly, Main, and
SC, Anchoring,
C
Strong support for social comparison and anchoring theories, with compensation
Crystal, 1988; ASQ
Tournament
committee member pay associated with CEO compensation. No support for
tournament theory in predicting CEO compensation.
Perry and Zenner, 2001;
C
Compensation committees consider the regulatory environment when making CEO
JFE
compensation decisions.
For Theoretical Frame: (MP) Managerial Power Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social Networking Theory, (SOC) Standard Optimal
Contracting Theory, (UE) Upper Echelons Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.
Table 6. Outcomes: Misconduct and inappropriate behavior
Authors, Year; Journal
Theoretical
Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in
frame
methods)
Committee independence
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and
C
An independent compensation committee alone does not reduce likelihood of the receipt
Peyer, 2010; JOF
of lucky stock option grants. However, the presence of at least one large blockholder on
an independent compensation committee reduces the likelihood of opportunistic timing
of option grants by 71%.
Bedard, Chtourou, and
Agency
A
Financial expertise constrain aggressive earnings management. Strong negative
Courteau, 2004; AJPT
relationship for audit committee member independence with excluding stock options
from compensation and aggressive earnings management. No relationship found for audit
committee activity and earnings management. (e)
Brochet and
A
Independent directors on the audit committee have a greater likelihood of being named a
Srinivasan, 2014; JFE
defendant in a class action lawsuit than directors not on the audit committee. (e)
Bruynseels and
Agency, SN
A
Audit committees with friendship-related social network ties to the CEO purchase fewer
Cardinaels, 2013; TAR
audit services, engage in more earnings management, and are less likely to issue goingconcern opinions or report internal control weaknesses. Social ties between audit
committee members and CEOs that were formed from advice networks do not influence
the quality of audit committee oversight. (e)
Callaghan, Saly, and
C
Percentage of insiders on compensation committee negatively related to option repricing
Subramaniam, 2004; JOF
and is a more important predictor than percentage of insiders on the full board or insider

Carcello and Neal, 2000;
TAR
Felo, 2001; JBE

Agency

A

Agency

C

Klein, 2002a; TAR

Agency

A

Krishnan, 2005; TAR

Agency

A

Larcker, Richardson, and
Tuna, 2007; TAR

A

Schnatterly, 2003; SMJ

Agency

A

Uzun, Szewczyk, and
Varma, 2004; FAJ

Agency

A, C,
N

Agency

A

SN

A, C,
N

Committee composition
Beasley, 1996; TAR
Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, and
Yang, 2014; MS
DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1991; TAR
Naiker and Sharma, 2009;
TAR
Committee characteristics
Ndofor, Wesley, and
Priem, 2015; JOM

A

stock ownership. Presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee reduces
likelihood of repricing, while the presence of a nonexecutive chairman on the
compensation committee increases likelihood of repricing.
A greater percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee reduces the likelihood
of the firm's auditor issuing a going-concern report.
Ratio of insiders on compensation committee positively related to firm not having an
ethics program.
Audit committees with less than 50% independent directors associated with larger
adjusted abnormal accruals. Movement to a minority-independent audit committee
associated with large increases in adjusted abnormal accruals. (e)
Audit committee independence and financial expertise on the audit committee negatively
associated with internal control problems.
No relationships between affiliated directors on the audit committee and number of audit
committee meetings with abnormal accruals, earnings restatements, and future
performance. (e)
Greater levels of audit committee independence and meetings are not related to the
likelihood of a first crime, but may help prevent subsequent crimes.
The presence of an audit committee was negatively associated with fraud, but presence
of a compensation committee and grey directors on major committees was positively
associated with fraud.
Outside director ratio associated with lower financial statement fraud. Audit committee
presence (pre-SOX) and its interaction with the ratio of outside directors not associated
with financial statement fraud.
Directors on the nominating or compensation committee receive higher than average
returns from stock purchases than other directors, while there is no such advantage for
directors on the audit committee. (e)
Presence of an audit committee (pre-SOX) negatively associated with overstated earnings.

Revolving
Door

A

Former audit partners on the audit committee, regardless of affiliation with the firm's
current auditor, are negatively related to the reporting of internal control deficiencies. (e)

Agency,
Complexity

A

The relationship of industry and firm complexity with fraudulent reporting is negatively
moderated by more stringent audit committee monitoring. (e)

Badolato, Donelson, and
Ege, 2014; JAE
Chan, Chen, Chen, and
Yu, 2012; JAE
Farber, 2005; TAR

Agency

A
A

Agency

Audit committees with higher status and financial expertise are associated with lower
accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. (e)
There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and clawback adoption.

Fraudulent firms associated with fewer audit committee meetings and financial experts
on audit committee. Firms adjusting governance to findings of fraud have more audit
committee meetings.
Keune and
ED, ARP
A
Negative relationship found for audit committees with greater financial expertise with
Johnstone, 2012; TAR
likelihood of waiving material misstatements.
For Theoretical Frame: (ARP) Auditor Reputation Protection, (ED) Economic Dependence, (SN) Social Networking Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.
Table 7. Outcomes: Accounting practices
Authors, Year;
Theoretical
Journal
frame
Committee
independence
Abbott et al., 2004;
AJPT
Abbott et al., 2003;
AJPT
Carcello and
Agency
Neal, 2003: TAR
Karamanou and
Vafeas, 2005; JAR

Committee
composition

Agency

A

Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in
methods)
A
A
A
A

Likelihood of restatement is less for firms with fully independent and more active audit
committees who include a financial expert. (e)
Audit committee independence and inclusion of financial expertise are positively associated
with audit fees. (e)
Audit committee independence, governance expertise and member stock ownership
positively related retaining an auditor after issuance of an unfavourable report. Auditor
dismissal positively related to subsequent audit committee member turnover.
Managers in firms with more effective audit committee structures (e.g., higher ratio of
independent members, larger size, more frequent meetings, and higher ratio of financial
experts) more likely to make or update earnings forecasts. Forecasts in firms with more
effective audit committee structures likely to have less precise, but more accurate forecasts,
and more likely to result in a positive market reaction.

Cohen et al., 2013;
TAR

RD

A

Gaynor et al., 2006; Agency
TAR

A

Hoitash et
al., 2009; TAR
Knapp, 1987; TAR

Agency

A

Exchange

A

Naiker et al. 2012;
TAR
Venkataraman, et
al. 2008; TAR
Committee
characteristics
Abbott et al.
, 2007; TAR

A

Agoglia et al2011;
TAR
Beck and
Maudlin, 2014; TAR
Engel et al. 2010;
JAE

A

Kalbers and
Fogarty, 1998; JMI
Krishna et
al., 2011; TAR

A

A

Power, Agency

A

Agency,
Managerial
Productivity
Agency,
Institutional
Agency

A
A
A

Audit committees with more members who are both accounting and industry experts
perform better than audit committees with just accounting experts, or, in some cases, audit
committees with only financial supervisory expertise. (e)
Audit committee members more likely to have joint provision preferences similar to investors
if audit quality improves and more reluctant than investors to recommend joint provisions
when public disclosures are required.
Number of audit committee meetings, but not audit committee size, positively associated
with material weaknesses disclosed. (e)
Audit committee members more likely to support auditors, instead of management, during
audit disputes. Audit committee member less likely to support the auditor when disputes
were not related to technical standards or when the firm is in a strong financial position.
Former audit firm partners, regardless of affiliation, on the audit committee reduce non-audit
services purchased from the auditor.
In pre-IPO situations, the presence of an audit committee is negatively associated with
accruals.
Firms with effective audit committees less likely to outsource routine internal auditing to an
external auditor, while no such relationship was found for outsourcing non-routine audit
activity.
The relationship between the CFO applying a more precise standard with the likelihood of
aggressive financial reporting was negatively moderated by audit committee strength.
More powerful audit committees were associated with smaller audit fee reductions, while
more powerful CFOs were associated with larger audit fee reductions. (e)
Audit committee members' total compensation and cash retainers were positively associated
with the demand for monitoring. (e)
Level of inside director ownership negatively associated with audit committee legitimacy.
Outside directors on the board positively associated with audit committee legitimacy.
Legal expertise on audit committee positively related to financial reporting quality. Positive
effects of legal expertise combined with accounting expertise on the audit committee are
greater after SOX. (e)

Leventis et
al., 2013; CGIR

A

Banks with effective board and audit committee governance structures recognize larger loan
loss provisions on nonperforming loans compared to banks with ineffective governance
structures. (e)
Magilk et al., 2009; Agency
A
Audit committee members prefer aggressive financial reporting when compensated with
TAR
current stock and overly conservative reporting when compensated with future stock. Audit
committee members with no stock-based compensation are the most objective.
Seabright et
SE
A
Tenure of the relationships between audit committee members and auditor is negatively
al., 1992; AMJ
associated with the likelihood that the firm switches auditors.
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SE) Social Exchange Theory
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit.
Table 8. Outcomes: Other firm-level outcomes
Authors, Year;
Theoretical
Type
Journal
frame
Anderson et
Agency
A
al., 2004; JAE
Cheng, 2004; TAR

Agency

Gomulya and
Boeker., 2016;
SMJ
Guo and
Masulis, 2015; RFS

Ng and Tan, 2003;
TAR
Stevenson and
Radin, 2009; JMS

C
A
N

Behavioral
Negotiating,
Exchange
Agency, Social
Capital, SN

A
A, C

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in
methods)
Audit committee independence is associated with lower cost of debt financing. Audit
committee size and number of audit committee meetings are negatively associated with debt
yield spreads. (e)
CEOs may opportunistically reduce R&D spending when they approach retirement or their
firm faces a small earnings decline. Compensation committees make changes in CEO option
compensation to prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D spending. (e)
Replacement of audit committee members leads to higher probability of CEO replacement. (e)
Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or adopt a fully independent
nominating committee significantly increase their forced CEO turnover sensitivity to
performance relative to compliant firms. Effect of nominating committee independence
stronger when CEO was previously on the committee. Board and nominating committee
independence associated with more effective CEO monitoring and discipline. (e)
The availability of guidance from the audit committee has a stronger effect on the potential
for not meeting analysts’ expectations when the audit committee is not effective.
Serving on the compensation committee associated with greater influence on overall board
decision-making. No relationship found for audit committee membership with influence.

Zhang, 2008; SMJ

Information
Asymmetry

N

Presence of an independent nominating committee at the time of succession reduces the
likelihood of new CEO dismissal. When outside directors have fewer external directorships,
the likelihood of new CEO dismissal is lower in firms with a nominating committee.
For Theoretical Frame: (SN) Social Networking Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.
Table 9. Findings related to less traditional committees
Authors, Year; Journal
Theoretical
Type
frame
Environmental and
corporate social
responsibility issues
Berrone and GomezInstitutional,
E
Mejia, 2009; AMJ
Agency
Davidson and
Institutional,
E
Worrell, 2001; B&S
Configurational
Eccles et al., 2014; MS

Stakeholder

McKendall et al., 1999;
IJOA

E
CSR, E,
Eth,
PP
A, E

Peters and Romi, 2014; JBE

Stakeholder,
Legitimacy

Walls et al., 2012; SMJ

Agency,
Stakeholder

CSR, E

Agency

SP

Presence of non-required
committees
Beekun et al.,1998; JOM

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if endogeneity was
addressed in methods)

Firms with an environmental committee do not reward CEOs with environmental
strategies more than CEOs without environmental strategies. (e)
Presence of an environmental committee positively associated with reduced
industry fines. Companies in ‘dirtier’ industries are less likely to have an
environmental board committee.
High sustainability companies are more likely to form board committees on
sustainability
The presence of an ethics, public policy, or corporate social responsibility
committee is not related to environmental violations.
For environmental committees, presence, size, number of meetings and expertise
of its members positively associated with likelihood of a greenhouse gas
disclosure. Committee size associated with lower transparency. Overlap of board
members serving on the audit and environmental committees positively
associated with likelihood of greenhouse gas disclosure. (e)
Presence of an environmental committee is positively related to environmental
performance.
The presence of a strategic planning committee is negatively related to emphasis
on financial outcomes in CEO evaluation. (e)

Gore et al., 2011; SMJ

Agency

F

Henke, 1986; JBS

SP

Premuroso and
Bhattacharya, 2007; CGIR
Outcomes from nonrequired committees
Fracassi and Tate, 2012;
JOF

T

Ex, PA

Presence of a finance committee is negatively associated with annual CFO equity
incentives and the proportion of compensation comprised of equity. (e)
Presence of a strategic planning committee correlates with management
participation and breadth of involvement in strategic planning activities.
Firms’ corporate governance ratings and performance (ROA, ROE, margin) are
positively related to voluntary decisions to form technology committees.

Connected directors more likely to serve on the executive committee. Merger and
acquisition activity more frequent when executive committee contains connected
directors. Firm value decreases more from connectivity of executive committee
members than from connectivity of board members. (e)
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (Ex) Executive, (CSR) Corporate Social Responsibility, (E) Environmental,
(Eth) Ethics, (F) Finance, (PA) Public Affairs, (PP) Public Policy (SP) Strategic Planning, (T) Technology.

However, the use of other theoretical perspectives has varied widely across disciplines. In our review,
we found that management has taken the most diverse approach, with agency theory being the chosen
framework in approximately 35 per cent of the studies reviewed in which a theoretical frame was
identified. Institutional theory and, relatedly, social networking theory have been used by management
scholars, especially when examining committee existence and membership. Resource dependence has
also been used in management studies, but to a lesser extent in recent years. Additionally, management
scholars have used a variety of other behavioural theoretical lenses, including social comparison theory
and economic perspectives such as human capital theory.
Finance, in contrast, is even more heavily focused on agency theory; around 75 per cent of board
committee studies in finance stating a theoretical frame used agency theory. Some studies have drawn
heavily from other economic perspectives (e.g., contracting, bargaining power, human capital theory).
Still, finance scholars examining board committees tend to cluster work around basic economic ideas
with little influence from organization theory (e.g., resource dependence, institutional theory) or
behavioural decision-making frameworks (e.g., equity theory, social comparison theory).
Accounting scholars fall somewhere between management and finance scholars, with agency theory
being used in a little more than 60 per cent of the studies of board committees that stated a theoretical
framework. While accounting scholars have primarily used other economics-based theories in addition
to agency theory, important accounting studies of board committees have been published using
resource dependence and social networking theory, as well as several other behavioural decisionmaking approaches.
In terms of antecedents and outcomes of board committees, accounting scholars dominate published
research on audit committees and how accounting practices are affected by board committee
composition and characteristics, but have shown little interest in how committee members are selected.
Management and finance scholars have shown a substantial and fairly equal focus on firm performance
and executive compensation as major outcomes influenced by board committee characteristics. All
three disciplines have been interested in examining how board committees may affect misconduct or
illegal actions by firm managers.

An Agenda for Future Research on Board Committees
Based on our review of board committee research, we identified several areas in which existing research
can be extended or enhanced by using new theoretical perspectives or methodological approaches. In
this section, we provide recommendations by outlining three broad areas for moving board committee
research forward: revisiting established topics with different approaches and theories, studying
underexplored areas, and methodological improvements. An overview of this recommended research
agenda is provided in Figure 2. We first begin by discussing some of the most promising areas for
theoretical enhancement, such as examining the role of director human and social capital and diversity
and dynamics among committee members. While these approaches have been applied at the level of
the entire board, they are scarce in board committee research.

Figure 2 Agenda for future board committee research

Revisiting Established Topics with Different Approaches and Theories
Director human and social capital

Board level research illustrates the importance of directors’ human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills and
experience; Becker, 1994) and social capital (i.e., personal networks with associated reciprocity;
Lin, 2017), though it can be difficult to distinguish between human and social capital (Haynes and
Hillman, 2010). Research suggests that to perform its monitoring and resource provisioning functions
appropriately, directors must have the necessary combination of human and social capital (Hillman and
Dalziel, 2003; Withers et al., 2012). While these influences are important at the board level (e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2013), committees exist for distinct purposes and directors’ human and social capital
associated with those purposes may serve an even more essential role. However, the value of such
capital to a committee is likely to be bounded by the nature of committees’ tasks. For instance, the audit
committee requires extensive monitoring by directors to maintain the independence of the external
auditor and examine financial statement accuracy (Carcello et al., 2011). Thus, a director's accounting
skills and financial reporting expertise, combined with prior experience working for or with an external
auditor, contribute to the quality of monitoring by the audit committee. However, other aspects of

human and social capital (e.g., experience in mergers and acquisitions) may be valuable to the board,
but would be of little value to the audit committee.
As such, an avenue for future research is to explore whether director human and social capital transfers
to all committees conditioned on the nature of the committee's purpose. Given the primary monitoring
role played by the audit committee, human capital should have a stronger influence on its effectiveness
(Carcello et al., 2011), something recognized by capital markets when directors with accounting
expertise are appointed (Davidson et al., 2004). At the same time, social capital, particularly ties to
executives within the firm, may dampen audit committee effectiveness by making directors more
sympathetic to management and reducing the quality of oversight. Social capital, however, may be of
utmost importance to nominating committees, where directors are tasked with finding high quality
future directors and recruiting them to the board (Eminet and Guedri, 2010). In the middle, the
compensation committee's focus on executive compensation and, in many cases, executive succession
planning, may leverage both human and social capital. On the one hand, the compensation committee is
tasked with limiting managerial opportunism through rent-seeking, requiring social capital, experience,
and other facets of human capital to identify such behaviour. At the same time, social comparison
theory suggests that social capital might lead to increases in CEO compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996).
As a whole, the value of director capital is likely to be reflected differently at the committee level than it
is at the board level. When monitoring or advice are necessary, human capital is likely to take a
prominent role. When the focus is placed on resource provisioning or accessing external parties, social
capital is likely to be more important. Research can examine whether committees perform better based
on the accumulated capital brought by directors and whether this capital matches the requirements of
the committee, as well as the specific types of capital that influence the committee's effectiveness in
accomplishing its purpose.
One final important aspect of committee functioning is the relevance of a director's human or social
capital to the committee. Compared to employed executives, retired executives bring a wealth of
knowledge to boards that is more readily available (Platt and Platt, 2012). As such, retired executives
may serve in a more meaningful manner by being available for counsel. This experience, however, is
only valuable to the extent that it is relevant in the firm's context. While retired executives may be more
involved, their contributions may be based on obsolete knowledge or relationships. For instance, such
directors on the compensation committee may make incomplete social comparisons (see Belliveau et
al., 1996). Research could examine the effect of retired executive directors on committee performance,
particularly when potentially obsolete human or social capital could influence committee effectiveness.
Of course, scholars examining this question should acknowledge that retired executives serving as board
members have more available time to serve on committees compared to other board members.

Diversity and dynamics among committee members and across contexts

In our review, we show that an oft-studied aspect of board composition is the degree of diversity or
dissimilarity among board members along different dimensions, such as gender, race, or functional
background. At the level of the entire board, scholars have found that different types of director
diversity may constrain strategic change (Goodstein et al., 1994; Tasheva and Hillman, in press), but also
increase firm value (Carter et al., 2003) and performance (Erhardt et al., 2003).

Management research, however, illustrates that differences among directors can become problematic
when they create faultlines between factions due to social categorization processes which yield conflict
and cause disruptions through the creation of schisms among directors (Veltrop et al., 2015). Faultlines
exist when there are categorizations, primarily based on demographics, which might lead directors to
group themselves into smaller subgroups. While faultline research is nascent at the board level, we
believe it has important implications at the committee level for two reasons. First, the effects of
faultlines on group performance may be exacerbated within smaller groups like board committees.
Strong faultlines require homogeneity within subgroups (Lau and Murnighan, 1998), which is unlikely
across multiple attributes in larger groups (Hart and Van Vugt, 2006). Second, board committees are
more deeply focused on specific topics, requiring greater attention and discussion on contentious issues.
Deep divides are more likely to breed conflict, which is also enhanced by faultlines (Thatcher and
Patel, 2012). This does not indicate the entire board is immune to conflict, but rather suggests that such
contentious issues (e.g., dismissing a CEO) are less likely to arise on a routine basis.
Exploring committee faultlines is potentially illuminating, since it can highlight mechanisms through
which director diversity may not translate to performance. Boards may not consider director
characteristics, traits and experience when determining committee membership, creating faultlines in
committees. Given that faultlines often lead to conflict and reduced task satisfaction (Thatcher and
Patel, 2012), committee faultlines may lead to member turnover or disengagement in activities
particularly critical for the organization, hampering committee effectiveness. Research might also
explore how committee composition changes influence potential faultline shifts and, subsequently,
committee effectiveness. New committee members can be brought on to break up existing subgroups,
replace a departed subgroup member, or reinforce existing subgroups (Thatcher and Patel, 2012).
Changes in committee membership may have a significant influence on the working relationships among
committee members going forward. As boards increase diversity, it is important to understand how
diversity's effects might be leveraged differently at the committee level.
Relatedly, recently published theory associated with boards and corporate governance has predicted
that diversity across individuals (i.e., team diversity) and the ranges of diversity within individuals (i.e.,
personal diversity) may be the missing link when attempting to understand the how diversity influences
team outcomes (Tasheva and Hillman, in press). Such arguments suggest that team diversity may be
overstated if the overlap of non-dominant backgrounds or network ties among team members is not
considered (Zhu et al., 2014). However, Tasheva and Hillman theorize that, within boards, team and
personal diversity may act as substitutes or complements to one another, and that the need for
collaboration to fulfil tasks determines whether they act as such. Integrated with or independent from a
study of faultlines in board committees, examining team and personal diversity not only at the board
level, but also at the committee level may bring an entirely new perspective of when and where
diversity provides the most value.

Infusion of new theoretical perspectives

As noted earlier, our review shows committee level research has drawn heavily on agency theory (70
out of 142 studies), with most research emphasizing independence and diligent monitoring. Since
director responsibilities have expanded over time, we believe board committee research needs more
extensive application of other management theories, including resource dependence, upper echelons,
and institutional and network theories, to gain a more detailed picture of a committee's role in

governance. Indeed, the virtual disappearance of insiders on most boards over the last two decades calls
into question how to examine independence from an agency theory approach (more on this point later).
Board-level research integrating multiple theoretical perspectives has been the catalyst for developing
new board-level theories (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2018; Hambrick et al., 2015), as well as serving as the
foundation for new findings associated with board membership and the board's monitoring and
resource provisioning functions (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008). Integrating
management theories with agency theory may provide a better understanding of the rationale for
appointing certain directors to committees and how those committees help firms adapt to their
environment. For example, are directors more likely to become committee members due to their
monitoring and counselling skills (resource dependence theory), friendship ties to existing directors
(network theory), or individual characteristics (upper echelons perspective)? Furthermore, we envision
scholars utilizing network theory to examine whether committee members use their network status to
gain power and how that power translates into committee decisions. Are higher-status committee
members likely to exercise their power across all committee decisions or selectively dominate key
committee decisions? Do high status directors influence board appointments, thus further enabling a
small network of corporate elites?
As we have argued in the previous pages, we believe that future progress will come through theories
that either complement or compete with agency theory approaches to board committees. Within
resource dependence theory, examining the human and social capital of board committee members will
likely yield new insights, but will also require the understanding and measurement of director
experiences, expertise and social connections. Likewise, we expect group dynamics research to play a
stronger role in future studies. Because board committees are relatively small in size, dysfunctional
relationships between several members could have a disproportionate effect on the committee's
performance of its duties.

Studying Underexplored Areas
In the following sections, we provide further suggestions for different topics to be explored within new
or enhanced theoretical frameworks.

Additional predictors of board committee composition

In our review, we discuss research findings on factors influencing committee composition. While
director human capital, independence, demographic characteristics and behaviour predict committee
composition, we envision a greater and more diverse set of predictors. Firm strategic direction, resource
requirements, and director social capital may serve as important predictors of committee membership.
One research opportunity is to examine how restructuring activities, including acquisitions, mergers and
divestitures, impact board committee composition. Since these activities are associated with significant
structural and executive changes in the firm (Haleblian et al., 2009), such changes may also reach board
committees. For example, how likely and under what conditions are a target firm's directors invited to
serve on committees in the acquiring firm? Drawing on group diversity research, we could expect that
an acquiring firm's strong culture of inclusiveness (Chatman et al., 1998; Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002)
positively impacts the addition of target firm directors to the acquiring firm's board committees. An
equally important research question relates to understanding how dynamics within committees are
impacted by the addition of target firm directors and how such new members are integrated. We
speculate that the addition of target firm directors could initially yield relational conflict, limiting

cohesion (Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007), but may also bring more diverse perspectives for comprehensive
decision making.
In addition, we envision the application of resource dependence and network theory to examine how a
director's experiences, expertise and social ties predict committee membership. For example, we
speculate that current or former members of leading executive compensation consulting firms have
strong credentials and are perceived as highly relevant additions to the compensation committee.
Similarly, a current or former CEO who has led a successful turnaround may be a highly-sought addition
for a newly formed strategic planning committee, since he or she can enhance a committee's and firm's
credibility. Additionally, examining whether politicians, due to their social connections, fame and
experience, are more likely to chair a firm's governance committee would be thought-provoking and
valuable, as well as shedding light on whether political connections can bring valuable resources to the
board and its committees within various contexts. These research opportunities can examine matches
between committee functions and the skills and resources needed to perform those functions.
Haynes and Hillman (2010) also found positive effects from directors’ cumulative human capital breadth
and negative effects from cumulative human capital depth on firm outcomes. As board committees
have more focused objectives, future research that extends Haynes and Hillman's work to the
committee level could yield valuable insights regarding the right mix of experience, functional expertise
and networking for committees to meet their objectives.
Finally, prior research has not addressed how director turnover influences committee composition.
Given committees’ small size, the turnover of one member not only changes a committee's
configuration, but may also alter committee dynamics and functioning. For example, if an audit
committee member retires from the board, general and firm-specific financial knowledge may be lost
and the power dynamics within the audit committee may be dramatically changed. In such cases, does
the board prioritize hiring a replacement with similar functional background and experience, a similar
demographic background, a close relationship with the remaining audit committee members, or a
replacement who brings a different skillset and unique expertise and experience? In a broader sense,
research is needed to understand the influence of the nominating committee and its members on the
demographics, skills and experience of new board and committee members.

Focus on less traditional committees

As our review revealed, the bulk of research has been centred on the three major committees, as only
11 of the 142 articles examined less traditional committees. Greater attention can be given to less
traditional committees, examining why they exist and the degree to which they influence various
processes and firm outcomes. Given the rising importance of CSR and increases in shareholder activism,
we envision a positive relationship between CSR-related shareholder proposals and the formation of
CSR committees. Furthermore, this relationship should be stronger when shareholder activists have
greater experience with prior campaigns and when firms exhibit, or the media reports them as having,
CSR violations.
Changes in societal norms or perceptions could be an important driver for the emergence of less
traditional committees. For example, recent revelations of sexual misconduct and harassment might
force firms to create committees responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal
treatment and protection of employees. We speculate that the announcement of such committees

would be perceived positively by the market only when their purpose is not perceived by stakeholders
as impression management.
Board-level factors are also likely to impact the emergence and purpose of less traditional committees.
Using a finance committee as an example, it would be interesting to test the following competing
hypotheses: the presence of directors with financial expertise is positively associated with the formation
of a finance committee and, alternatively, weak financial expertise on the board is positively associated
with the formation of a financial committee. The first hypothesis argues that greater expertise in a
specific function drives formalized structures associated with that function, while the latter hypothesis
argues that formal structure is used to overcome functional weaknesses.
Because the vast majority of large firms in English common law countries have compensation,
nominating/governance, and audit committees, less traditional committees might offer a fruitful setting
for testing resource dependence versus institutional theory as a driver of committee existence. If a
firm's strategy or industry creates crucial resource contingencies, specialized committees might develop
from that dependence. For example, firms that use a substantial amount of clean water for operations
may be more likely to have environmental board committees. In contrast to such an explanation,
environmental committees may be more likely to be established when the firm's board has interlocks to
other firms with environmental committees. This suggests an institutional theory explanation in which
the presence of board committees is motivated by a need for legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). Such research could extend to a number of less traditional board committees.

Interactions between various committees

As shown in our cross-disciplinary review, most research has examined committees in isolation and
overlooked interactions between committees and their members. One way to increase focus on this
topic is to draw on the idea of complementary versus substitute governance mechanisms (e.g., Misangyi
and Acharya, 2014) and examine if and when different board committees serve as substitutes or
complements. For example, what is the interplay between the nominating and compensation
committees and its impact on firm performance? Is it sufficient to have an independent nominating
committee that is responsible for appointing the ‘right’ CEO and directors to guide the firm?
Alternatively, an independent nominating committee may be necessary but not sufficient, with firms
also needing a vigilant compensation committee that complements the nominating committee and
ensures that a new CEO's compensation structure incentivizes value maximization. Furthermore, recent
studies drawing on fuzzy set methodology have shown that performance is influenced simultaneously by
multiple governance factors that operate as complex configurations (e.g., Misangyi and Acharya, 2014).
Applying this logic to committees, scholars need to consider committee characteristics, such as size,
composition, tenure, and expertise, as a configuration when examining their association with firm
performance and other outcomes.
Another important committee phenomenon is directors who simultaneously serve on multiple
committees. Such common membership is characterized by complex dynamics and interactions among
directors. For example, Brandes et al. (2016) found that directors serving simultaneously on audit and
compensation committees act as important conduits for knowledge transfer between directors’
monitoring and incentive alignment duties, leading to lower executive compensation. In contrast, Liao
and Hsu (2013) find that common committee membership can make directors too busy, resulting in
poorer earnings quality and reduced CEO pay-performance sensitivity. These conflicting results indicate

that further research into common membership is needed to determine whether the benefits of
knowledge transfer outweigh the drawbacks of busyness (e.g., Ferris et al., 2003). A contingency
perspective might bring better understanding to this question. For example, directors of firms in
industries with greater uncertainty and unpredictability could face additional cognitive pressures that
might overwhelm and further distract them, reducing their ability to effectively contribute to multiple
committees.
Further, the characteristics of such directors may influence their effectiveness. Retired directors may
have additional time to devote to the firm, reducing problems associated with busyness. Alternatively,
busyness may be a substantial problem if a director is a sitting CEO of another firm and has membership
on multiple committees. Moreover, overlap might be particularly important for some critical board
functions. For instance, CEO succession planning may be the purview of multiple committees: the
nominating committee identifies, evaluates and hires new directors and ensures they buy into the
importance of succession planning, while the compensation committee provides incentives to attract,
develop and retain high potential executives. Ultimately, committees may have responsibilities geared
toward accomplishing a common goal and coordinating activities among them may be critical to
achieving that objective.
Finally, future research on common committee membership could focus on the degree to which
committee interlocks create potentially harmful isomorphism. An influential director serving on multiple
committees may compel each committee to function too similarly or frame issues and potential
directions in the same manner. To the degree that committees help drive the firm forward through indepth discussion and a focus on key issues, interlocks may reduce the firm's ability to adapt and
consider alternative directions in a meaningful fashion.

Interactions of committees with the full corporate board

From our review of the literature, another area with negligible prior research is the interactions
between committees and the full board. A key feature of board committees is their ability to utilize
specialized knowledge and skills (Kesner, 1988), which allows them to perform specific tasks more
efficiently and effectively than the full board. Since committees play an integral and complementary role
to the full board, it is important for future research to provide a deeper and more comprehensive
understanding of the relationships and interactions between board committees and the full board.
Expertise and experience deserve further attention, examining the interaction of their specialized nature
at the committee level and their general nature at the board level. For example, how does nominating
committee expertise interact with other directors’ expertise to identify director candidates? While we
can expect a positive relationship between nominating committee social capital and appointing
prestigious directors, we speculate that other directors’ interlocks and network connections (e.g., their
social capital) strengthen the relationship.
We believe it is also important to examine fit between structural characteristics, such as independence,
of committees and the full board. While it is logical to expect that committee independence interacts
with board independence to constrain managerial self-serving behaviour and enhance firm
performance, it would be interesting to examine how committee independence and lack of board
independence impact firm performance. Can committee independence compensate for the lack of
overall board independence? If true, such research can offer a new understanding of the equivocal

findings on the effectiveness of board independence on firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998). It
would also be interesting to examine the interaction of additional governance mechanisms, such as
equity ownership. For example, is the compensation committee's equity ownership sufficient to
constrain CEO total compensation and ensure CEO pay-performance sensitivity, or does the
compensation committee's equity ownership need to be paired with the full board's equity ownership
for shareholder value maximization?
Finally, the nested structure of committees within corporate boards is associated with directors having
multiple work-related identities (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006). Audit committee members, for example,
associate themselves with the accounting and finance professions, with the audit committee, and with
the firm's board. Given that identities can shape behaviour and the salience of a particular identity is
dependent on the surrounding context (Ashforth, 2000; Hillman et al., 2008), directors might exhibit
different behaviours dependent on the role that they are currently serving. When a director is
performing audit committee functions, he or she might focus on specific details regarding reporting
accuracy (i.e., ‘the trees’). However, in full board meetings, the same director might stress the
importance of long-range planning and strategy (i.e., ‘the forest’). How might these multiple identities
and potential identity conflicts impact the overall effectiveness of directors and their contribution to
firm value creation? Overall, we believe that utilizing multi-level analysis for committee and board
research could enhance understanding their complex and multi-faceted nature and relationships.

Board committees and directors' power

Prior work has also extensively examined committees’ impact on board decision-making processes and
organizational outcomes. In doing so, scholars have primarily focused on the committee as a level of
analysis and relied on aggregating directors’ characteristics to theorize how and when committees are
more likely to exercise power. While research advances our understanding of committees’ role in
governing the firm, it has left many unanswered questions about the power of committee members.
For example, committee chairs are likely to have greater power than other committee members, as the
committee chair sets its agenda. Therefore, constructs often examined at the committee level, such as
human or social capital through board interlocks, should be examined at the committee chair level. The
committee chair's power may be enough to affect the firm regardless of the other members’
characteristics, rendering other directors’ capital moot.
Future research could study how directors’ power associated with major committee membership is
perceived by CEOs. Do CEOs try to limit the power of major board committee chairs and, if so, in what
ways? One covert approach to undermine power is to push for the appointment of diverse and conflictprone directors who oppose and disagree with the committee chair, inhibiting committee social
integration (see O'Reilly et al., 1989). Relatedly, what do CEOs do when they disagree with a major
committee's decision? While, in some cases, CEOs may adapt to such a decision, they may also seek to
control processes, not due to opportunism, but because they have better information. Additionally, if
CEOs anticipate conflicts with a committee and its members, do they focus on developing relationships
with committee members or do they seek ways to place similar or more supportive directors on that
committee?
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine how director turnover is affected by the power
stemming from committee membership. Do directors on lower-status and voluntary committees turn

over more than directors on higher-status, mandatory committees? On one hand, higher-status
committees are more visible, and their mistakes and ineffective decisions are more likely to lead to
external pressure for members to resign (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). On the other hand, higher-status
committees garner more power for members to withstand such pressure.
Addressing these questions associated with CEO and director power creates a challenge for scholars.
Utilizing established board capital measures, such as functional categories (see Hillman et al., 2000) and
measuring directors’ industry embeddedness, expertise and interlocks (see Haynes and Hillman, 2010),
may begin to address challenges at the committee level. Archival measures of CEO (see
Finkelstein, 1992) and director power (see Westphal and Zajac, 1995) may also be beneficial for
examining committee member power. However, if scholars are going to better understand power in
committees, or how CEO power may or may not overcome a powerful committee chair, we recommend
the development of new scales and interview methodologies. We endorse an updated version of scales
developed by Pearce and Zahra (1991) that focus on ethics, process, style and effectiveness of
committees. Scholars would then interview committee members during their available time when the
board is meeting.

A more comprehensive view of independence

The predominance of independent boards post-SOX may have made research examining board
independence somewhat obsolete (Joseph et al., 2014). However, it has also opened up avenues for
new research examining different director characteristics (Krause et al., 2013). Indeed, the role of
independence in committee composition and function is a rich topic for employing more refined
predictors of committee membership with an emphasis on professional affiliations and social
connections.
We found that 34 studies operationalized independence in our review, yet only 13 studies used samples
that spanned pre- and post-SOX enactment in 2002, and only four studies used samples solely after SOX.
Studies using samples prior to SOX often applied simpler measures of independence, such as no
relationship with management (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003) or the majority of directors on the committee
having not been employed by the firm (e.g., Krishnan, 2005). For research utilizing samples partially or
fully after SOX, we see greater consideration of all types of prior and current relationships and
affiliations. Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2013), for instance, considered social network ties between audit
committee members and the CEO, finding that such ties influence the firm's financial reporting
behaviour, while Hwang and Kim (2009) utilized an extensive array of possible social linkages between
audit committee members and CEOs in a pre- and post-SOX sample, finding that CEOs receive larger
bonuses when audit committees, despite being conventionally independent, are socially linked.
Future research that more extensively captures committee members’ expertise and histories, with an
emphasis on past personal and professional relationships, offers the opportunity to bridge social
networking and social exchange theories with agency theory to offer fresh, wide-ranging insights
regarding committee members meeting their fiduciary duties. Additionally, committee members’
alignment with the current CEO may also influence their execution of fiduciary duties. Prior research
offers evidence that directors without any formal ties to the firm may refrain from independent decision
making due to social and other relational ties with the CEO (Westphal and Graebner, 2010). We
recommend future studies that consider the breadth of social dependence and how various ties and

connections (e.g., joint membership in clubs and associations, graduation from the same university
cohort) influence a committee's ability to perform its duties.
We also encourage a far greater examination of board member longevity and independence. An
examination of interdependence, in which directors are conventionally independent but began serving
as director after the CEO started in his or her position (see Dalton et al., 1998), may improve scholarly
understanding of whether CEOs are able to choose more sympathetic directors and how those directors
influence committee outcomes. Alternatively, long-serving board members may have a strong familiarity
with firm strategies and operations or may have developed close relationships with firm executives and
other board members. Future studies examining whether committee member longevity and ability to
act independently may help scholars resolve previous ambiguous findings, such as those associated with
the relationship of committee independence and CEO compensation (e.g., Faulkender and Yang, 2010).
Only a handful of studies consider the effects of ownership among committee members on committee
composition and outcomes, with research largely centred on blockholders on committees (e.g., Bebchuk
et al., 2010; Callaghan et al., 2004; Yermack, 1997). Future research could draw from power theories to
explore whether directors with greater equity ownership are more likely to gain influence on certain
committees. For instance, a director who holds more equity may be more likely to become committee
chair and, thus, control the agenda. Exploratory research may even reveal which committees are
thought to be most powerful given which committee seats and chairs are held by powerful directors.
Further, scholars may use research on equity among directors to explore whether the equity
concentration of committee members may improve monitoring among audit committee members or
enhance shareholder value creation through executive compensation. Such findings may build on
research by Deutsch et al. (2011) who identified that stock options provided to directors are more
effective in encouraging firm risk than those provided to CEOs. Finally, it may be beneficial to utilize
prior research on the types of institutional investors and blockholders to explore whether differences in
owner preferences influence committee outcomes. For instance, the existence of a transient
institutional investor on the compensation committee may result in a significantly different executive
compensation arrangement than one in which a dedicated institutional investor was appointed to the
committee. Such arrangements may result in greater principal-principal conflicts.

Methodological Improvements
Endogeneity

Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) asserted that since boards are developed by firms to address potential
agency problems, studies examining boards suffer from endogeneity as the variables of interest are
often endogenous. Additionally, since a director's membership on a committee is not random, the
relationships between members’ characteristics and various firm and board outcomes are likely to be
endogenous. For example, prior research has examined how compensation committee members’
diversity, pay, and social status (Belliveau et al., 1996; Conyon and He, 2004; Conyon and Peck, 2004)
impact executive compensation. Yet, directors are appointed to the compensation committee based on
their prior experiences and behaviours (e.g., Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988). Not accounting
for selection bias in committee membership or overlooking the impact of the full board could raise
validity concerns about the effects of directors’ characteristics on executive compensation. Similarly,
scholars examining the formation of committees, especially less traditional ones, may face endogeneity
concerns.

As shown in Tables 3 through 4, we have noted studies in which the research design accounted for
endogeneity in its methodological approach. In our review, only 20 per cent of pre-2001 studies
employed analytical specifications to deal with endogeneity; however, over 75 per cent of the post-2010
studies employed such methods. These findings suggest that methodological rigor today is more
commonly employed by scholars and expected by leading journals. While finance scholars were the first
to emphasize and address this issue, it is clear that such rigor is now considered essential in accounting
and management research. Gupta and Wowak (2017), for example, utilized instrumental variables,
Heckman selection models, and fixed-effects regression to address reverse causality and unobserved
heterogeneity. Other scholars have used similar methods to validate that results have not been
influenced by endogenous factors (e.g., Bruyneels and Cardinaels, 2013; Hoitash et al., 2009). It is
imperative that scholars continue to utilize appropriate techniques to alleviate endogeneity concerns;
however, we are encouraged by the increasing attention paid to methodological considerations of
endogeneity.8

Measurement of committee independence

Research primarily operationalizes committee independence as either a continuous variable, measured
as the percentage of independent committee members, or as a dichotomous variable set to 1 when a
majority of members are independent (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2012) or there is an
independent lead director (Cheng et al., 2010). Given changes in independence requirements following
SOX (see Table 2), it is important to consider how independence is measured. Consistent with our
previous recommendation for a more comprehensive view on independence, we offer four suggestions
to scholars which would enable an examination of committee member independence in line with
today's governance climate. First, for committees in which the traditional measure of independence can
still be used, relationships should be explored using a proportional, rather than dichotomous, measure
of independence. Second, alternative measures of social dependence, capturing an extensive array of
connections, are needed to understand if committee members act independently. Third, the longevity of
a committee member, both overall and in relationship to the CEO, should be used to consider whether
the committee member is too bound to firm history or the CEO to act independently. Lastly, scholars are
encouraged to develop more behaviourally-oriented measures of independence, including scales that
apply survey-based methodologies.

Alternative sources of data collection

We have a limited understanding of how board committees function and this is mainly due to the
exclusive reliance on archival methods for obtaining data on board committees. While we recognize that
it is extremely difficult to achieve sufficient response rates or access when surveys or qualitative
methodologies are employed, we reaffirm the previous call of Johnson et al. (2013) that scholars
examining boards need to gain better access to executives and board members, since closer and more
personal access is essential to understanding how board committees function. In particular, even limited
observation of committee meetings could yield insights on how committee members interact with each
and with the broader board. There is likely to be considerable variation in the degree to which the full
board is informed about the committee's work, and understanding how these interactions affect not
only the committee, but also the board's knowledge and information, could be beneficial.

Conclusion
Board committee research has been a growing field. However, despite the increased attention from
various disciplines, such as management, finance, and accounting, the literature on board committees
has developed rather independently and with little integration. The purpose of this review was to
aggregate existing board committee research, synthesize the main antecedents to committee formation
and membership, and outline the key outcomes associated with board committees. Based on this
review, we identified weaknesses and gaps in prior research that could be leveraged to generate new
and exciting knowledge about board committees. From these findings, we proposed a series of
recommendations for future research. We believe that greater focus on independence, committee
members’ human and social capital, committee diversity and power, and interactions between various
committees could significantly enhance our understanding of board committees’ role in corporate
governance. We are hopeful that our review spurs new scholarship related to board committees, as this
is where the real work is accomplished in boards.
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Notes
1 We limited our review to English common law countries because of their publicly-traded firms'
extensive use of board committees and a legally-mandated focus on shareholder value
maximization for public firms in these countries. Many other highly advanced economies, such
as Japan and Germany, follow two-tier board structures that may provide a domain for future
board committee research.
2 Changes introduced in 2011 require ASX 300 firms in Australia to have remuneration (i.e.,
compensation) committees. In general, the other English common law countries tend to have
very similar governance rules on committees to the US, with public firms allowed to explain
exceptions to investors and small firms exempted from enforcement.
3 Studies examining factors and variables impacting the formation and composition of board
committees are grouped together as antecedents of board committees.
4 This is the first of several statements related to a study's effect size. As the results presented and
discussed in some articles do not provide sufficient information to make clear practical effect
size statements, this information is only provided for a subset of the studies in this review.
5 Studies focusing on the various results and effects associated with board committees' influence are
grouped together as outcomes of board committees.
6 Sun and Cahan (2009) define compensation committee quality as members having greater
shareholdings, being more senior and experienced, not being appointed by the current CEO,
serving in a greater number of directorships, and not serving as CEOs at other firms.
7 Abnormal accruals is defined as the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her guidance regarding endogeneity in board committee
research.
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